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RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS: IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Allison Fetter-Harrott* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What effect, if any, does recognition of same-sex marriage 
have on public schools? This question may be viewed from a 
variety of perspectives-social, psychological, historical, and 
others. This paper seeks to identify from a legal perspective the 
ways in which the struggle regarding governmental recognition 
of same-sex marriage relates to public schools. 
The connection between same-sex marriage and public 
schools may seem attenuated, but a study of debates, cases, 
and literature surrounding the controversy reveal three 
prevailing issues: 1) whether or not recognition of same-sex 
marriage would, as some campaigners have suggested, legally 
compel a curricular change in public schools; 2) whether 
parents have authority to challenge curricular interventions 
that pertain to same-sex marriage; and 3) whether, and to 
what extent, denying same-sex couples the right to marry 
works in some jurisdictions an infirmity of those individuals' 
parenting rights or has another negative effect, such as 
creating greater uncertainty for children and schools. Before a 
discussion of these three questions, to set the backdrop for the 
discussion, Section II of this paper will provide a brief legal 
history establishing context for the debate on same-sex 
marriage recognition, and Section Ill will address the 
prevalence of same-sex parented families in the United States. 
* J.D.; Ph.D. student, Indiana University-Bloomington School of l~ducation. The 
author thanks her mentors Dr. Martha McCarthy and Dr. Suzanne Eckes and 
colleague Emily Richardson for their guidance and assistance in this article. 
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II. AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY OF THE U.S. LEGAL STATUS OF 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Before considering what effect, if any, legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage might have on public schools, it is helpful 
first to identify briefly the legal context in which the same-sex 
marriage debate arises. In its 1985 decision in Bowers u. 
Hardwick, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to a 
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy, brought by an individual 
arrested after engaging in a consensual sexual act with another 
man in his own home. Relying on prior Supreme Court 
precedent recognizing a field of privacy rights protecting 
individual autonomy in the sphere of sexual activity, 
procreation,2 contraception,3 interracial marriage between 
members of the opposite sex,4 and abortion,5 the plaintiff 
brought a claim alleging that the statute violated his rights to 
engage in private associational activity under the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Court 
framed the question in Bowers as considering whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment's fundamental right to privacy 
extended to confer a "constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy."6 As framed, the Court held no such 
right existed, as-in the Court's judgment-it was neither 
implicit in the preservation of liberty or justice, nor was it 
"deeply rooted in th[e] Nation's history."7 
In the decade following Bowers, two important and 
seemingly opposing developments arose pertaining to the basic 
relational human rights of gay and lesbian persons. Congress 
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines 
marriage as the legal union of a man and a woman under 
federal law8 and provides that U.S. states and other units are 
not required to recognize same-sex marriages joined under the 
1. 178 U.S. 186 (1985). 
2. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 5:35 (1912) (dealing with sterilization and 
equal protection). 
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 138 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, :l81 U.S. 
479 (1965). 
1. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
5. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 131 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
6. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
7. !d. at 192 (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 1:31 U.S. 194, 50:l (1977)). 
8. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
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laws of other states and unitsY Despite the relative longevity of 
the statute, litigation continues, with disagreement among 
courts as to DOMA's breadth and the extent to which it 
complies with the Constitution. 10 
Additionally, in Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the contours of equal protection rights for gay and 
lesbian individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. 11 Romer was a challenge of an amendment 
to the Colorado Constitution that nullified private and public 
legal protections against anti-gay sexual orientation 
discrimination, many of which were reflected in employment, 
housing, and human rights ordinances throughout Colorado. 12 
Because it was designed to remove these protections and to 
expressly permit discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
the Court viewed the amendment as crafted to broadly 
disadvantage a distinct group. 13 This aim could not survive 
even the Court's rational basis review, wherein a statute 
passes constitutional muster where it "bears a rational relation 
to some legitimate end." 14 The Court rejected the proposition 
that the law was designed to protect the freedom of association 
of those who disagreed with homosexuality; its means were so 
sweeping as to bear no rational relation to those aims. 15 
Accordingly, as a "status based" law designed to "classif[y] 
persons undertaken for its own sake," the Colorado amendment 
did not comport with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 16 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Bowers legacy was short-lived 
after Romer. In Lawrence v. Texas, 17 the Court reconsidered 
the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing sexual conduct 
between two adults of the same sex. Framing the question in 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 17:38C (2006). 
10. Cf. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the application 
of DOMA to the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act was unconstitutional); 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (finding DOMA unconstitutional); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. 
Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (same). But see Wilson v. Ake, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1298 
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding DOMA enacted within Congress's powers). 
11. 517U.S.620(1996). 
12. ld. at 628. 
13. !d. at 6:35. 
14. Jd. at 631. 
15. ld. at 685. 
16. /d. at 624, 635. 
17. 539 U.S. 558 (200:l). 
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those terms, the Court re-explored its prior decisions regarding 
sexual and reproductive rights and overturned Bowers, 
explaining that the prior opinion "fail[ed] to appreciate the 
extent of the liberty at stake." 18 Undoing Bowers, the Court 
observed its own "emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex" and for 
"protection to personal decisions relating to marriage" and 
other private personal relationships. 19 Given the prominence of 
these rights and because the Bowers holding "demean[ed] the 
lives of homosexual persons," the Court found that state laws 
criminalizing sexual activity between two consenting adults 
violate fundamental liberty and privacy interests protected by 
the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.20 In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia remarked 
that the majority and concurring opinions "le[ft] on pretty 
shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples."21 
In recent years, courts, legislatures, and voters have 
grappled with whether a state must, should, or should not 
recognize same-sex marriage. Perhaps the most famous battle 
over recognition of marriage of same-sex couples emerged in 
California. In 2008, the California Supreme Court found in In 
re Marriage Cases22 that state statutes limiting marriage 
recognition to only heterosexual couples violated California's 
state constitution. Shortly thereafter, however, California 
voters enacted Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment 
stating "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid 
or recognized in California."23 After challenges to Proposition 8 
were rejected by California state courts, challengers brought 
their claims to federal court. In Perry u. Schwarzenegger, 
plaintiffs alleged that Proposition 8 violated the U.S. 
Constitution.24 The district court agreed, finding that the 
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause and the 
substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth 
18. Id. at 567. 
19. Jd. at 572-71. 
20. !d. at 575. 
21. ld. at 601. 
22. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
23. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
21. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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Amendment because the exclusion of gay and lesbian 
individuals from the institution of marriage bore no rational 
relationship to any legitimate state interest. 25 Just days after 
the Perry decision was decided, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit granted a stay halting enforcement of the 
decision pending appeal.26 The result is that marriages 
between same-sex couples legally recognized in the period 
between Marriage Cases and Proposition 8 are valid, but same-
sex couples cannot currently be newly married in California. 
So although the U.S. Constitution protects the rights of 
individuals to engage in private sexual and romantic 
relationships with another adult of their choosing free from 
criminalization, marital recognition of those consenting 
relationships exists only in an evolving and devolving 
patchwork of state-specific laws across the country. As of July 
2010, six jurisdictions recognized marriage between individuals 
of the same sex: Connecticut,27 Iowa,28 Massachusetts,29 New 
Hampshire,30 Vermont,31 and the District of Columbia.32 Nine 
states recognized domestic unions or civil partnerships in some 
form. 33 Seven states recognized out of state marriages between 
same-sex couples.34 Twenty-nine states had constitutional 
amendments either banning marriage between individuals of 
the same sex or empowering the legislature to do so. 35 The 
remammg states' statutes permitted in language or 
interpretation recognition of only those marriages between 
25. ld. at 100:3. 
26. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
16, 2010). 
27. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that 
the statute limiting marriage as between only opposite-sex couples violated the 
Connecticut constitution). 
28. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding denial of marriage 
benefit to homosexual couples did not comport with the equal protection clause of the 
Iowa constitution). 
29. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. 2003) (holding 
refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the liberty and equality 
requirements of the Massachusetts constitution). 
:10. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 457:46 (2010). 
:11. VT. STAT ANN. tit 15, § 8 (2010). 
32. D.C. CODE§ 16-401 (2010). 
3;1. Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
http://www .I ambdal egal.org/pu b lications/ articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-
relationships.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
:11. ld. 
35. ld. 
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opposite-sex spouses. 36 And undoubtedly, as judicial and 
political challenges abound, the vitality of governmental 
recognition of same sex marriage likely will continue to change 
0 0 1n coming years. 
Ill. THE PREVALENCE OF SAME-SEX PARENTED FAMILIES 
Estimates of the prevalence of same-sex parented families 
vary somewhat, perhaps relating to historical gaps in census 
data, reluctance of gay and lesbian individuals publicly to 
identify as such given fear of discrimination, and other factors. 
However, some valuable data about same-sex parented families 
has been identified. 
Nearly one-quarter of same-sex couples in America are 
raising a child.37 These families live in every state3R and in an 
estimated 96% to 99% of the counties in the United States. 39 As 
of the year 2000, it was estimated that one-sixth of gay men 
had fathered or adopted a child and more than one-third of 
lesbians had given birth to a child.40 Another study estimated 
that one-fifth of gay men and one-third of lesbians were raising 
children in the home.41 More recent studies estimate that 
approximately one-fifth of same-sex couples are ra1smg 
children in the household.42 Additionally, gay and lesbian 
parents are parenting or otherwise caring for tens of thousands 
of American children through adoption and foster care each 
36. ld. 
37. Gary J. Gates, Census 2000, GLBTQ: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAY, LESBIAN, 
BISEXUAL, 'I'RANSGENDER, AND QUEER CULTURE (2001), http://www.glhtq.com/social-
scienccs/census_2000.html. 
38. ld.; TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARIUED-
COUPLE AND UNMARIUED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 (200:3), http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2003pubs/censr-5. pdf. 
39. DAVlD M. SMITH & GARY J. GATES, HUMAN WGHTS CAMPAIGN, GAY AND 
LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER 
HOUSEHOLDS (2001), available at http://www.urhan.org/UploadedPDF/1000-191_gl_ 
partner_households. pdf. 
40. GARY J. GATES ET AL., URHAN lNS'l'JTUTE, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY 
AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at 
http://www2.law.ucla.cdu/williamsinstitute/puhlications/FinalAdoption/{cport.pdf. 
41. SIMMONS & O'CONNELL, supra note 38, at 10. 
42. MARTIN O'CONNELL ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW ES'l'JMA'I'~;s OF SAME-
SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY Table 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.ccnsus.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/SS_ncw-
estimates. pdf. 
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year.43 It is estimated that approximately 65,000 (or 4% of) 
adopted children were living with gay or lesbian parents as of 
2000.44 And approximately 14,000 (or 3% of) foster children 
were being cared for in foster homes by gay and lesbian foster 
parents.45 
This data reveals that gay and lesbian parented families in 
the United States are a social fact in communities across our 
country. These families are not, as some would suggest, 
relegated to a small number of certain communities. Rather, 
they are raising children in virtually every locale in the United 
States. 
IV. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SCHOOLS: POLITICAL STRATEGY 
OR IMMINENT CURRICULAR SHIFT? 
In the American education system, general powers of school 
governance rest with state governments. Typically, states 
manage their curricular powers by enacting broad statutes 
establishing threshold curricular requirements, 
recommendations, or prohibitions and by delegating powers to 
state boards and departments of education.46 
So how do public schools find themselves thrown into the 
debate over whether to recognize marriage of adult same-sex 
couples? Schools, important territory in U.S. civil rights 
struggles, offer particularly fertile soil for the so-called "culture 
wars." Concepts like fairness and intolerance take on deeper 
hues when reflected in the education of children.47 And from a 
practical perspective, advocates recognize what the courts have 
long appreciated: we look to schools to reproduce our civic 
4:3. GATES ET AL., supra note 10, at 7-8, 15. 
14. /d. at 7. 
45. /d. at 15. 
16. See, e.g., Carolyn Depoian, Homosexuality, the Public School Curriculum and 
the First Amendment: Issues of Religion and Speech, 18 L. & SEXUALITY 163, 169-70 
(2009); Laura A. Jeltema, Legislators in the Classroom: Why State Legislators Cannot 
Decide Higher Education Curricula, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 215, 223-21 (2004). See also 
STEPHEN B. THOMAS ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 2-
6 (6th cd. 2009). 
17. Josie Foehrenhach Brown, Representative Tension: Student Religious Speech 
and the Public School's Institutional Mission, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 26 (2009); Douglas 
NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences 
Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, 310-11, 328 
(2009). 
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virtues.48 Because public schools provide most children with 
their first and most enduring experience with government, 
many advocates on a host of issues see schools as a place where 
culture is made and remade.49 
Accordingly, some on both sides might view the debate 
about same-sex marriage as perhaps no different from other 
civil rights battles. Some claim that, embodying principles of 
equality, schools should acknowledge same-sex couples to 
reduce discrimination. Others worry that discussion of sexual 
orientation in schools will undermine the roles of disapproving 
parents' in their children's religious upbringing.50 Some have 
additionally alleged, however, that opponents of equal rights 
for same-sex couples place children at the center of the debate 
to foster unfounded fears. 51 These scholars have opined that 
discourse critical of homosexuality has often in its 
conceptualization of homosexual persons focused singularly on 
sexual behavior.52 That framing tends to provide an over-
sexualized conception of gay men and women, the argument 
goes, a conception that paints them unfairly as a threat, 
playing on fear. 53 
Much recent public discussion about the recognition of 
same-sex marriage and public schools surrounded the debate 
leading up to enactment of California's Proposition 8. 
Proposition 8 proponents through public advocacy alleged that 
recognition of same-sex marriage would require schools to 
"teach gay marriage," even to very young students.54 For 
48. See e.g., Plyler v. Doc, 157 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[Ejducation has a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society."). 
49. /d. See also NeJaimc, supra note 4 7, at ::332. 
50. See, e.g., Charles J. Russo, Same-Sex Marriaue and Public School Curricula: 
Preserving Parental Rights to Direct the /~duration of Their Children, 32 DAYTON L. 
REV. 361, 361 (2007). Of course, where the debate is as to the extent to which schools 
should discuss sexual orientation-and not just marriag(_~this debate will continue 
regardless of same-sex marriage recognition. 
51. See, e.g., Ne,Jaime, supra note 47, at 373; Joyce H. Hahn, Note, Proposition 8 
and Education: Teaching Our Children to Be Gay? 19 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 119, 
151 (2010); Ruth Butterfield Isaacson, Comment, "Teachable Moments':· The Use of 
Child-Centered Arguments in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 98 CAL. L. REV. 121 
(2010). See also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 701 F. Supp. 2d 921, 100:1 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
52. NeJaimc, supra note 47, at 370-71. 
53. See id. 
54. Tamara Audi, ,Justin Scheck & Christopher Lawton, California Votes for Prop 
8, WALL S-r. J., Nov. 5, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1225860567599 
0067:i.html. 
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example, the Proposition 8 ballot argument to voters asserted 
that it: 
[P]rotects our children from being taught in public schools 
that "same-sex marriage" is the same as traditional 
marnage .... 
. . . If the gay marriage ruling [of the California Supreme] is 
not overturned, TEACHERS COULD BE REQUIRED to 
teach young children that there is no difference between gay 
marriage and traditional marriage. We should not accept a 
court decision that may result in public schools teaching our 
own kids that gay marriage is ok. 55 
Additionally, some Proposition 8 supporters advanced ads 
that linked the recognition of same-sex marriage and schools. 
One commercial advertisement depicted a young girl declaring 
to her mother that she learned in school about a king who 
married another king and, as a result, she believed she could 
marry a princess. 56 A law professor narrator stepped into the 
frame, stating: "Think it can't happen?" referring to the scene. 
"It's already happened," he continued. "When Massachusetts 
legalized gay marriage, schools began teaching second graders 
that boys can marry boys. The courts ruled parents had no 
right to object." Another narrator continues while a legal 
citation appears, "Under California law, public schools instruct 
kids about marriage. Teaching children about gay marriage 
will happen here unless we pass Proposition 8."57 The 
advertisements imply not just that children would be exposed 
to same-sex marriage as a social occurrence, but that if gay 
marriage continued lawfully, schools would be legally 
compelled to indoctrinate them as to the moral rightness of 
same-sex marriage. 58 Those who advocate against recognition 
55. Perry, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (quoting the California Voter Information Guide 
for the Nov. 1, 2008 California General Election. Proposition 8 Arguments-Voter 
Information Guide 2008, http://www.voterguide. sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/ (follow 
"Proposition 8" hyperlink; then follow "Arguments and Rebuttals" hyperlink)). 
56. See Yes on 8 TV Ad: It's Already Happened, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 0PgjcgqFYP4 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
57. See id. 
58. Hahn, supra note 51, at 160. 
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of same-sex marriage have advanced similar arguments m 
political contests over the right to marry in other states. 59 
Many attribute the focus on schools with the success of 
anti-same-sex marriage measures. Given these recent 
campaigns, discussion is warranted as to whether the 
recognition of same-sex marriage equality would incur some 
legally compelled curricular shift in public schools. To do so, it 
is relevant to consider the curricular schemes of some of the 
states in which lobbyists have recently launched this argument 
and, using these case studies, to consider the impact, if any, 
that recognition of same-sex marriage might work on those 
schemes. 
A. California 
The Proposition 8 advertisement discussed above cited 
California Education Code § 51933 for the assertion that 
without the intervention of a ban on recognition of marriage 
between same-sex couples, California schools were in danger of 
being legally compelled to "teach gay marriage."60 But the cited 
provision, found in California's Comprehensive Sexual Health 
and HIV/AIDS Prevention Education Act-quoted only in 
highly selective part in the commercial-actually requires 
schools to provide age appropriate, medically accurate, and 
objective instruction that "teach[es] respect for marriage and 
committed relationships."61 The statute requires that a school 
electing to provide a curriculum relating to sexual health and 
relationships "be appropriate for pupils of all races, genders, 
sexual orientations, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and 
pupils with disabilities."62 The requirement that the 
curriculum be appropriate for students of varying sexual 
59. Sue Ellin Browder, Teaching Same-Sex "Marriage," NA'r'L CATH. HEr:., March 
2009, available at http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/17432; Katherine Gregg, 
Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage File Suit to Allow Unlimited Campaign Spending in 
Rhode Island, PRO.JO.COM, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.projo.com/news/content/same_ 
sex_marriage_lawsuit_09-28-10_KGK3KOD_ v26.2308dfO.html; Eric Hussell, Question 1 
TV Ad Sparks Charges of "Blatant Misinformation," BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2009, 
http ://new. bangordai lynews.com/2009/1 0102/news/question -1-tv -ad -sparks-charges-of-
lsquobla tan t-m i sinforma tionrsquo. 
60. See Yes on 8 TV Ad, supra note 56. See also Hahn, supra note 51, at 161-69. 
61. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51933 (West 2009) (emphasis added). See also CAL. DEP'T 
OF EDUC., HEALTH EDUCATION CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 
KlNDERC:AHTEN THROUGH GRADE TWELVE (2008), available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/ 
be/st/ss/documents/healthstandmar08.pdf. 
62. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51933 (emphasis added). 
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orientations, plural, already contemplates discussion of same-
sex relationships. And the provision of the California Education 
Code prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination likewise 
contemplate generally more egalitarian handling of the topic.63 
The statute references a "respect" for marriage, which some 
commentators have observed may imply, not instruction 
regarding the rightness of same-sex marriage, but rather 
respect in the form of appreciation of diversity. 64 But the 
statute does not just reference instruction about respect for 
marriage. It references the importance of teaching respect for 
committed relationships/)5 which certainly includes same-sex 
romantic relationships. Accordingly, same-sex couples' 
relationships already fit within the class of relationships which 
students should learn to respect under the relevant curriculum 
statute. And, as other commentators have observed, the 
provision regarding teaching respect for marriage is optional, 
emphasizes the importance of allowing parents to opt their 
children out of sexuality education, provides parents wide 
ranging access to materials, encourages students to consult 
with parents and guardians regarding sexuality, and 
recognizes parents as the primary teachers of sexuality 
information.66 Accordingly, when placed in context, arguments 
or implications made politically the recognition of an 
inalienable right to marry the adult of one's choice would 
compel a curricular change on public school children appears, 
at best, exceedingly weak. 
B. Maine 
As in California, some opponents of the recognition of same-
sex marriage in Maine have additionally supported ballot 
initiatives with arguments linking the recognition of marriage 
rights with at least an implied legal compulsion of "teaching 
gay marriage" in public schools.67 In 2009, Maine's voters 
passed Question 1, a ballot initiative invalidating a previously 
enacted law recognizing same-sex marriage.68 In commercials 
63. !d.§§ 200, 212.6, 220. 
64. Hahn, supra note 51, at 161-68. 
65. !d. 
66. See id. at 162, summarizing CAL. Enuc. ConE§§ 51933-34, 519:37-39. 
67. See Russell, supra note 59. 
68. Question 1 was titled "An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and 
Affirm Religious Freedom" and stated, "Do you want to reject the new law that lets 
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supporting the measure, a proponent stated that Question 1 
"[had] everything to do with schools," and implored viewers to 
"vote Yes on Question 1 to prevent homosexual marriage from 
being taught in Maine schools."69 
These arguments beg the question of whether, as suggested, 
recognition of same-sex marriage rights in Maine indeed would 
work some legally compelled curricular shift. Maine's statutes 
require that children in grades Kindergarten through grade 12 
receive what is known as "Comprehensive Family Life 
Education," including instruction on "human development and 
sexuality, including education on family planning and sexually 
transmitted diseases."70 The statute on this curriculum also 
requires that lessons be "accurate and age appropriate," that 
they reflect community standards, emphasize the importance of 
parental involvement in the development of attitudes, build 
individual decision-making skills, and emphasize abstinence.71 
And parents have the opportunity to remove their children 
from such lessons if delivered in public schools.72 The Guiding 
Principles for the Learning Results require that Maine's 
students learn to be responsible and involved citizens able to 
understand the "diverse nature of society."73 Maine's Learning 
Results, the set of general overarching standards for the state's 
public schools, do not require explicit teaching of marriage or 
sexual orientation. And so the implication that same-sex 
marriage recognition would lead to a legally compelled 
curricular shift is not supported in the legal authorities 
governing Maine's curricula. 
C. Connecticut 
In Connecticut, some anti-same-sex marriage 
commentators, too, encouraged public concern over the link 
between recognition of marriage rights and public school 
same-sex couples marry and allows individuals and religious groups to refuse to 
perform these marriages?" See Bureau of Corporations, Elections, 2009 Referendum 
Tabulation, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html. 
69. See Russell, supra note 59. 
70. ME. REV. STAT. tit 22, § 1902 (2001). 
71. Id. 
72. Id.§191l. 
73. ME. DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIIlJNG PRINCIPLES (1997), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/education/lres/gp.pdf. 
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curricula. 74 Connecticut state law compels the state board of 
education to create guides to assist school districts in 
composing curriculum on family health, including but not 
limited to topics such as "family planning, human sexuality, 
parenting, nutrition and the emotional, physical, psychological, 
hygienic, economic and social aspects of family life."75 But 
exactly how to compose curriculum for such initiatives, or even 
to teach them at all, is still reserved to local school boards/6 
zones in which parents' and community members' views carry 
significant weight. Nor are students required to take part in 
such programs, if offered. 77 
Connecticut state law prohibits discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.n And Connecticut's state standards before 
the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling in Kerrigan that 
schools would teach students to demonstrate respect for others 
without regard to sexual orientation and other 
characteristics.79 The Connecticut standards do not specifically 
require public schools to teach anything about marriage in 
school and already championed efforts to dispel sexual 
orientation discrimination well before the decision in Kerrigan. 
As such, the claim that same-sex marriage would legally 
compel schools to "teach gay marriage" is not supported by 
governing authority. 
D. Rhode Island 
Relatively recent controversy has raised the same 
curricular debate in Rhode Island. 80 Rhode Island statutes 
mandate that schools teach a health curriculum. 81 This 
includes mandatory health and family life courses and HIV and 
AIDS education programs that involve accurate information on 
pregnancy and transmission and prevention of sexually 
71. See Browder, supra note 59. 
75. CONN. G~:N. STAT.§ 10-16c (West 2010). 
76. /d.§ 10-16d. 
77. /d. § 1 0-16e. 
78. ld.§10-15c. 
79. See CONN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONNECTICUT FRAMEWORK: K-12 
CURRICULAR GOALS ANIJ STANDAlWS (1998), available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/ 
sde/lib/sde/PDF/Curriculum/Curriculum_lioot_ Web_Folder/ctframe.pdf. 
80. Gregg, supra note 59. 
81. IU. GEN. LAWS§ 16-1-5 (2010). 
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transmitted infections, with a preference for abstinence.82 
Parents may elect to remove their children from these 
courses.83 And the Rhode Island standards governing sexuality 
education, while contemplating that schools will teach students 
about marriage, additionally provides that students will learn 
age appropriate lessons84 about dating, sexuality, and sexual 
orientation as well.85 The latter necessarily contemplates that 
students will learn about same-sex couples. And so, as in other 
states, there is little, if any, legal evidence that recognition of 
marriage equality for same-sex couples necessarily would itself 
legally work a curricular change on the state's schools. 
E. Political Strategy or Curricular Shift? 
This non-exhaustive survey of states in which the "teaching 
gay marriage" legal argument has been recently put forth 
reveals its substantial weaknesses. Certainly, given the broad 
national prevalence of same-sex parented families, who live in 
every state and nearly every county of the United States, 
schools in other states that teach children about family 
structure or committed adult relationships by implication 
should already be acknowledging the presence of those 
families, regardless of the legal status of the parents' 
relationships. And it is difficult to see how this issue is any 
different than teachings that acknowledge families with 
divorced or heterosexual unmarried parents, which are lawful 
even though they conflict with some religious views. Typically, 
and logically, same-sex marriage laws themselves do not 
specifically mention education. In fact, recognition of same-sex 
marriages would likely not require the kind of morally 
indoctrinating "teaching gay marriage" against which same-sex 
marriage opponents warn, just as failure to recognize gay 
marriage does not prohibit a curriculum that permits schools to 
instill in students respect for diversity of families and beliefs, 
including those relating to same-sex relationships and 
parenting. 86 
82. Id. §§ 16-22-17, 16-22-18 (2001). 
83. Jd. 
84. R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULES AND REnULATIONS FOR SCHOOL HEALTH 
PROGRAMS 10, 12 (2009), available at http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives/regdocs/ 
released/pdf/DOH/54 7l.pdf. 
85. Id. at 12. 
86. Consider Ohio, a state with a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex 
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Even if in some states the curricular scheme is such that 
campaign rhetoric like that discussed above presents a real 
connection between curriculum and recognition of same-sex 
marriage, those concerned about such curricular measures 
have other avenues for advancing their agenda. Given that 
curricular choices are often a matter of state-, district-, or 
school-level decision-making, same-sex marriage opponents 
may petition for curricular changes.87 And if same-sex couples 
are entitled to the fundamental right to join in marriage, 
allowing the curricular lobbying process to play out is far more 
just and democratic than denying an entire class of people 
marriage rights-and the many personal, economic, familial, 
and political rights and benefits that accompany marriage-to 
marriage. The Ohio Revised Code requires schools to offer courses in health education, 
including what Ohio terms "[v]enereal disease education." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3313.60(A)(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2009). This curriculum must stress an abstinence-only 
approach to sexuality education, including emphasizing the risks of sexually 
transmitted infections that accompany sexual activity, the side effects of sexual activity 
outside of marriage, and recommending that students abstain from extra-marital 
sexual activity. /d. § :l313.60ll(C)(l)-(7) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). Despite the refusal 
to recognize same-sex marriages, Ohio's education scheme necessarily contemplates the 
consideration of same-sex parented families in age appropriate ways in the public 
school curriculum. For example, the Ohio Department of Education's early learning 
standards contemplate young children sharing their personal family stories and 
traditions, which necessarily will include at least some classes acknowledging children 
who hail from same-sex parented families. OHIO DEP'T OF EDUC., EARLY LEARNING 
CONTENT STANDARDS 45 (2006), http://education.ohio.gov/GD/Templates/Pages/ODE/ 
ODEDetail.aspx'>Page=3&TopicRelationiD=l389&ContentiD=1629&Content=83592 
(follow "Early Learning Content Standards" hyperlink). They provide that children 
should learn about social units, like families, as well as differences in the structures 
and habits of those units. !d. at 44. The early learning content standards advance the 
quotation, "When all families are valued by society, all of society benefits." Id. at 48. 
Perhaps most directly dealing with these questions, the list of books recommended to 
fulfill these standards includes the book Heather Has Two Mommies, by Leslea 
Newman and Js Your Family Like Mine? by Lois Abramchik and Barbara Cavallo. 
0Hl0 DEP'T OF EDUC., EARLY LEARNlNC~PRTMARY CONTENT STANDARDS FOR SOCIAL 
STUDIES 62-6:J (2008), http://education.ohio.gov/G D/Templates/Pages/ODE/ODE 
Detai I. aspx? Page=3&TopicRela tion l D= 1389&ContentiD= 1629& Content=83592 (follow 
"Early Learning-Primary Content Standards for Social Studies" hyperlink). 
Additionally, the First Circuit has noted that a state in which same-sex marriage is 
recognized might have a rational reason to teach about legal status of such 
relationships. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2008). The court's statement 
did not, however, hold that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage required schools 
to engage in such teaching. !d. at 96. 
87. See Parker, 514 F.:Jd at 107; Kimberly Gee, Establishing a Constitutional 
Standard that Protects Public School Teacher Expression, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 409, 422-24 
(2009) (but students and parents "have no right to refuse or modify a curriculum with 
which they disagree."); Christopher M. Morrison, High Stakes Tests and Students with 
Disabilities, 41 B.C. L. RF:V. 1139, 1148 (2000) (states control education policy 
decisions). 
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guard against fears by some that doing otherwise would legally 
work a curricular shift in public schools. Of course, this is not 
to say that curricular initiatives identifying the diversity of 
healthy families thriving in our communities, including same-
sex parented and married families, are inappropriate in 
schools. In analyzing the existence of a relationship between 
U.S. public schools and our nation's debate regarding 
governmental recognition of same sex marriage, it is 
appropriate to identify the extent to which legal and political 
arguments made are based in legal doctrine, statutory 
language, and curricular policy. 
But this discussion would be incomplete if simply 
challenging the campaign assertion that curricular change is 
not legally required by recognition of same-sex marriage. We 
live in a time when anti-gay discrimination and harassment is 
rampant in our public schools, often with unacceptably 
disastrous circumstances for young people.88 In the debate 
regarding what schools must, should, or should not teach with 
respect to same-sex marriage and relationships, we must not 
forget our duty to keep all students safe from victimization and 
the potential benefits of curricular interventions designed to 
foster peaceful appreciation of students' families and identities. 
V. PARENTAL SCHOOL CHOICE, CURRICULAR CONTROL, AND 
"OPTING OUT" 
No matter the efforts made to unite factions in the debate 
over the recognition of same-sex marriage, some will object to 
curricular references relating to same-sex marriage and 
relationships. This controversy has arisen in states with and 
without same-sex marriage equality rights.89 Accordingly, this 
discussion examines the features of parental curricular 
objection rights relating to such objections. While these 
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED JN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND 
D!SCRIMINATJON AGAINST LES!lJAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSf;ENDEI{ STUDENTS IN 
U.S. SCHOOLS 1-3 (2001), available at http://www.prideagenda.org/portals/ 
O/pdfs/Youth%20-%20Hatred%20in%20the'%20Hallways.pdf. See also Jeremy Hubbard, 
Fifth Gay Teen Suicide Sparhs Debate, ABC NEWS, Oct. 3, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/gay-teen -suicide-sparks-debate/story?id= 11 788128. 
89. Discussion of opt-outs and marriage recognition should acknowledge that 
even absent same-sex marriage rights, questions of sexual orientation and the 
curriculum will endure, as same-sex couples are part of society, even where their 
marriages are unrecognized. 
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features are somewhat ambiguous under current law, recent 
opinions offer some guidance. 
Federal courts have long been trying to determine the 
contours of parents' rights to opt their children out of school 
measures with which they disagree. The most relied upon cases 
arose in the early twentieth century. 90 In Meyer v. Nebraska, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that a state law prohibiting non-
English school instruction ran afoul of the liberty rights 
guaranteed to all by the Constitution.91 In Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, the Court struck down a compulsory attendance 
statute as an infringement of parents' rights to direct their 
children's upbringing. 92 
Nearly half a century later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the 
Court considered whether compulsory education statutes 
violated the constitutional rights of Amish parents.93 The Court 
found Amish children could not be made to attend secondary 
school without directly impeding their religious practice-by 
requiring them to pursue courses of study and social pursuits 
that conflicted with their beliefs and by literally delaying their 
development in the labor of the Amish life. 94 The Court found 
that the state could not produce interests in the statutes that 
outweighed the parents' right to exercise their religion by 
raising their children in the insular Amish tradition. 95 
Modern decisions have grappled with questions of what 
these cases teach regarding the exact contours of parental 
autonomy to direct their children's education. What seems 
clear is that parents may remove their children from public 
schools where such schools' teachings and practices directly 
impact their exercise of basic liberties. But the cases do not 
interrupt the historical observation of deference to the state in 
delineating the features of public school instruction.96 
90. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. :390 (1923). 
91. Meyer, 262 U.S. at :199-101. 
92. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 518-19. 
93. 106U.S. 20~ 207(1972). 
91. !d. at 215-18. 
95. !d. at 221-29. 
96. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 50, at 375 ("In refusing to apply parens patriae to 
compulsory attendance [in Wisconsin v. Yoder], the Court did uphold the general 
principle that the state has the authority to regulate education."). 
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A. Parent Control of the Curriculum 
A widely publicized decision regarding parent challenges to 
school curriculum was issued by the First Circuit in Brown u. 
Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions.97 Here, parents alleged that a 
school assembly regarding sexuality-related topics, including 
homosexuality, violated their children's privacy rights, 
including their right to direct the upbringing of their 
children.98 The court received Brown as parental effort to 
dictate the high school curriculum, and it gave that challenge a 
chilly reception at best.99 The court explained: 
We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a 
parent, "You can't teach your child German or send him to a 
parochial school," than for the parent to say to the state, "You 
can't teach my child subjects that are morally offensive to 
me." The first instance involves the state proscribing parents 
from educating their children, while the second involves 
parents prescribing what the state shall teach their children. 
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to 
dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the 
schools would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student 
whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with the 
school's choice of subject matter. We cannot see that the 
Constitution imposes such a burden on state educational 
systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents as 
described by Meyer and Pierce do not encompass a broad-
based right to restrict the flow of information in the public 
schools. 100 
B. Parent Notice and Opt-Out 
Several courts have held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
familial right to control one's children generally does not 
provide the parent authority selectively to opt a child out of 
classes or other generally applicable school rules that the 
parent simply opposes, but some ambiguity lingers. 101 For 
example, in its 2005 decision in Fields u. Palmdale School 
97. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Martinez v. Cui, 
608 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2010). 
98. ld. at 529. 
99. ld. at 534. 
100. Id. at 53:-l-34. 
101. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.:id 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing cases); Leehaert 
v. Harrington, :1:12 F.:id l:H, 139-42 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found 
that the Fourteenth Amendment parental right did not grant 
parents "a right to prevent a school from providing any kind of 
information~sexual or otherwise~to its students." 102 Rather, 
the court explained, while Myers, Pierce, and Yoder 
demonstrated that parents have considerable authority 
regarding the choice of whether to send their children to public 
school, that right "does not extend beyond the threshold of the 
school door." 103 There has been more controversy, however, 
regarding the contours of a parent's right to opt a child out of a 
school curriculum to which the parent objects. 
A paradigm case in this sphere is Parker v. Hurley. 104 In 
Parker, two sets of parents brought claims alleging that by 
exposing their elementary school children to books that 
depicted same-sex couples, the school violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment familial right to raise their children and their 
First Amendment Free Exercise rights to practice their 
religion. 105 The plaintiffs in Parker rested their claims in their 
asserted right to notice and opt out of public school curriculum 
referencing the existence of same-sex partnerships. 106 One 
family alleged that the district violated their parental rights by 
refusing to give them notice and the opportunity to opt out 
regarding a book sent home with their child in a "diversity book 
bag." 107 The book was entitled, Who's in a Family? It depicted 
various kinds of families, including families with same-sex 
parent couples, and stated that a family is composed of those 
who love one another most. 108 The family demanded that "no 
teacher or adult expose [their child] to any materials or 
discussions featuring sexual orientation, same-sex unions, or 
homosexuality without notification to the Parkers and the right 
to 'opt out.'" 109 The family later asserted their objections when 
the child's first-grade classroom contained two books that 
referenced same-sex parented families. 110 Other parents 
102. 127 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009). 
lO:l. /d. at 1207. 
104. 514 F.:3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
105. /d. at 90. 
106. /d. 
107. /d. at 92. 
108. /d. at 92-93. 
109. /d. at 93. 
110. /d. 
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alleged that their family's parental and free exercise rights 
were violated when a teacher read to their son's second grade 
class a book entitled King and King about a prince who marries 
another prince. 111 
Parker left unresolved numerous aspects of free exercise 
jurisprudence as applied to public school curricular notice and 
parental opt-outs. The court declined to identify a specific test 
that applied to such claims. It considered carefully several tests 
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, including the test 
established in Employment Division v. Smith, which required 
that neutral and generally applicable statutes incidentally 
benefitting religious practice need only be supported by a 
rational basis, as opposed to a compelling state interest, to 
comport with the Free Exercise Clause. 112 The court rejected 
the application of this standard in Smith to Parker because the 
case did not call into question punishment for violation of a 
rule. 113 The court likewise rejected the test in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 114 which found 
invalid any statute targeting a specific religious group. 115 The 
Parker court considered, but did not address, the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Sherbert v. Verner, 116 which held that in 
individual benefit determinations, the government may not 
substantially interfere with an individual's central religious 
belief or practice unless justified by a compelling state 
interest. 117 Joining the Second Circuit, the court rejected a 
hybrid rights standard articulated in Smith's dicta referencing 
application of strict scrutiny to state-imposed limits on 
religious parental exercise. 118 
Identifying the appropriate test in Parker was unnecessary, 
the court explained, because each test required some showing 
111. Id. 
112. 191 U.S. 872. 879 (1990). See also Brown u. Hot. Sexy and Safer Productions, 
68 F.::ld 525, 538-39 (1st Cir. 1995), where the First Circuit found that the racy 
assembly did not violate parents' Free Exercise rights because its imposition was 
neutral and generally applicable. 
113. Parker, 511 F.3d at 95. 
114. 508 U.S. 520, 5:11 <32 (1993). 
115. Parker, 511 F.::ld at 96. 
116. 371 U.S. 398 (196:3). 
117. Parker, 514 F.:)d at 96. As the First Circuit noted in Parker, the lasting 
impact of Sherbert is unclear, as at least one Supreme Court case has referred to its 
rationale as having been rejected in Smith. See /d. at 96 n. 7 (quoting Gonzales v. 0 
Centro Espirita Heneficiente Uniaodo Vegetal, 546 U.S. 118, 421 (2006)). 
118. Id. at 98 (citing Leebacrt v. Harrington, 3:32 F.:id 131, 11:3-44 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
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that the actions complained of burdened the plaintiffs' religious 
practice in some way. 119 The plaintiffs in Parker, the First 
Circuit explained, failed to show any "constitutionally 
significant burden" on their rights. 120 The Court distinguished 
the claims from the Supreme Court's opinion in Yoder: whereas 
the Yoder plaintiffs sought the opportunity to retreat from 
public education because it would interfere with their religion, 
the Parker plaintiffs sought to engage their children in the 
public school but to be free of those aspects of the curriculum 
referencing phenomenon denounced by their religion. 121 Free 
exercise, the court explained, did not require public schools to 
"shield individual students from ideas which potentially are 
religiously offensive, particularly when the school imposes no 
requirement that the student agree with or affirm those ideas, 
or even participate in discussions about them." 122 
At least one commentator has opined that challenges like 
Parker, which allege that the "mere exposure" of one's children 
to the existence of family structures or relationships of which 
their religions disapprove, inherently are at odds with the 
concept of pluralism and tolerance underlying American 
education. 123 This view is also in line with the practical 
implications of modern U.S. public school classrooms. Imagine, 
for example, a teacher leading a class discussion on family and 
community, common in various states as referenced in 
curricula above. While addressing the concept of family is 
relevant to student development, each student brings varying 
family stories. Many of those stories, not just those of children 
with same-sex parents, will implicate some kind of activity that 
may not be blessed by the religion of every child in the room. 
Imagine the practical impossibility of acknowledging those 
varying family structures and providing the parents of each 
student whose religion may object to them with notice and the 
opportunity to opt out. The effect of such a duty, given the 
plurality of religious beliefs among public school children, 
would be to make it virtually impossible for a teacher to 
address those aspects of families. And though the contours of a 
119. ld. at 98-99. 
120. ld. at 99. 
121. /d. at 99-100. 
122. /d. at 106. 
123. NeJaime, supra note 47, at 362-64. See also Mozcrt v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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free exercise duty to opt-out a child may be less clear, courts 
have consistently held that parent attempts to dictate the 
curriculum's conformity with personal religious beliefs is not 
within the ambit of personal rights guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution. 124 
Yet Parker did not foreclose entirely a parent or child's free 
exercise right to opt out of a curricular intervention relating to 
same-sex marriage. Significantly, the Parker court rejected the 
proposition that Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions 
applied on the grounds that the age differences between the 
two groups of children warranted greater parental deference, 
implicating a stronger interest in notice and opt-out 
opportunities for younger children. 125 Additionally, the court 
pointed specifically to the kinds of interference with religious 
beliefs that-unlike mere exposure-might trigger a child or 
parent's free exercise rights. 126 "[T]he government may not," 
the court explained, "(1) compel affirmation of religious beliefs; 
(2) punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be 
false; (3) impose special disabilities on the basis of religious 
views or religious status; or ( 4) lend its power to one side or the 
124. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102 (citing cases). 
125. Id. at 100-01. A related point worth discussion is that in many cases 
challenging public schools' observance of religious teachings or practices, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has found such practices unconstitutional on the grounds that a school-
sponsored religious exercise has a powerful and even coercive effect on students, given 
the role that the public school plays in the lives of students. See generally, Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doc, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); 
Wallace v. Jaffrec, 172 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, :371 
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, :no U.S. 421 (1962). Some argue that this doctrine 
smacks of inconsistency when compared with courts' reluctance to prohibit schools from 
teaching messages that they find conflict with their own religious views, which they 
then view as antireligious. The distinction, however, is borne out of the unique respect 
in our nation's constitutional jurisprudence for the preservation of religion and its 
independence from government control or intrusion, embodied substantially in the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In Engle, the Court observed that the 
"first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rest[sj on the belief 
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade 
religion." 370 U.S. at 4:~1. Accordingly, "[wjhen the power, prestige and financial 
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief," the Court 
explained, "the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the 
prevailing officially approved religion is plain." ld. Engel remains a reminder of how 
the Establishment Clause aims to preserve the sanctity and independence of religion 
as much as the integrity of government. Accordingly, the complained of different 
treatment is granted precisely because of the sacred place in our jurisprudence for 
religious freedom. 
126. Parker, 511 F.3d at 10:3. 
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other in controversies over religious authorities or dogma." 127 
Additionally, while careful to avoid identifying exactly what 
actions would amount to a violation, the court noted that the 
boys were not forced to read a "constant stream" of books 
affirmatively advancing marriage between same-sex 
partners. 12X The Parker court's conception was reflected as well 
in the Sixth Circuit's Mozert decision, which by negative 
implication also shed light on the kinds of activities that might 
trigger an opt-out requirement under the Free Exercise Clause: 
forcing the student to engage in an act that violated her or his 
religion, the "affirmation or denial of a religious belief," or to 
engage in "performance or non-performance of a religious 
exercise or practice." 129 
VI. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND GREATER CERTAINTY FOR 
SCHOOLS AND PARENTS? 
The connection between recognition of same-sex marriage 
and public schools is, as explained above, attenuated. However, 
discussions regarding alleged negative implications beg the 
question of whether there are positive implications. This is 
admittedly a point for further exploration, but some discussion 
of this topic is warranted here. 
127. !d. 
128. !d. at 106-07. 
129. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987). 
Additionally, though not addressing Free Exercise claims, the District of Maryland's 
2005 decision in Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Public 
Schools identified aspects of a curriculum that ran afoul of the Constitution. No. AW· 
05·1194, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 81:cJO, at *28-*32 (D. Md. May 5, 2005). Where the 
curriculum refuted religious beliefs regarding the moral rightness of homosexuality, 
preferred religions that viewed homosexuality favorably, and criticized religions that 
condemned homosexuality, the curriculum did not comport with the tenets of the 
Establishment Clause, the court explained. !d. The court additionally opined that the 
school's curriculum violated the First Amendment's prohibition on viewpoint 
discrimination, indicating that the failure to provide a balanced range of views on 
homosexuality violated the First Amendment. !d. at *32-*35. While the court's 
Establishment Clause reasoning is cogent, the weight of the court's free speech 
reasoning is less certain. The Supreme Court has held that schools may limit school 
sponsored speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons. Ha?:elwood v. Kuhlmeier, 481 U.S. 
260, 27::3 (1988). The First Circuit recognized that encouragement of acceptance for 
diversity, including diversity based on sexual orientation, is a significant interest for a 
public school. And in Mozert, the Sixth Circuit rejected the theory that schools must be 
made to provide balanced information regarding sexuality, noting that balance in 
religious terms was impossibly subjective and that efforts to seek religious balance 
might tread impermissibly into the territory of actions aimed at or with the primary 
effect of advancing religion or of excessive entanglement. 827 F.2d at 1061-65. 
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Where same-sex parents are prohibited from marrying, 
some same-sex partners raismg children are-unlike 
heterosexual couples-prohibited from becoming a legal parent 
to the children whose upbringing they share. 130 A significant 
group-some estimate up to two-thirds-of children being 
raised in households by same-sex couples live in areas where 
one of their parents cannot form a legal relationship to them 
due to marriage or adoption inequality. 131 Children denied the 
rights to a legal relationship with one of their parents are also 
denied the security that comes with that relationship, 
including the right of support after parental separation, 
benefitting from employer-provided health benefits, survivor 
benefits, and others. 132 Recognition of same-sex marital 
relationships between adults caring for school children might 
very well bring those children greater certainty and security. 133 
From the perspective of school-related parental rights, a 
same-sex partner caring for a child might experience obstacles 
to exercising parental rights regarding the child if unable to 
become the child's legal parent due to marriage inequality. For 
example, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) grants parents the right to access their children's 
education records, to challenge the content of student records, 
and to release the records, among other rights. 134 The statute 
defines a "parent" as a natural parent, a guardian, or an 
individual acting as a parent in the absence of a parent or a 
130. Many states permit the adoption of ~hildren by same-sex couples, but in some 
states, refusal to recognize same-sex marriage creates barriers to legal parenthood. For 
example, North Carolina does not permit same-sex marriage. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 51-1.2 
(2009). And if an adoption petitioner is unmarried, no other person may join the 
adoption petition. ld. § 48-2-:JOl(c). A step-parent may adopt a step-child. ld. § 18-1-101 
(2010). And a child born of artificial insemination is the legal child of the husband and 
wife employing such technique. !d. § 49A-1 (2009). Additionally, Utah's constitution 
bans same-sex marriage, and its adoption statutes prohibit adoption of a child by any 
adult cohabitating in a relationship outside of marriage. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; 
UTAH Com; ANN. § 7813-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2010). Oklahoma's Constitution prohibits 
same-sex marriage, and its statutes permit adoption by single adults and married 
couples only. OKLA. CONS'!'. art. IT, § 35(A)-(B); OKLA. STAT. tit.lO, § 7508-1.1 (2009). 
Accordingly, in some states, marriage provides parental rights unavailable to same-sex 
partners raising children. 
131. LISA DENNETT & GA]{Y J. GATES, HUMAN HIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE 
COST OF MARRIAGE INEQUALITY TO CHILDREN AND THE!]{ SAME-SEX i'AHENTS 7 (20()1), 
available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/costkids.pdf. 
132. ld. at 8-12. 
133. !d. at 13. 
134. 20 u.s.c. § 1232g (2006). 
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guardian. 135 A school could conceivably release student records 
to a non-legal parent same-sex partner caregiver by treating 
that person as an "individual acting as a parent" within the 
meaning of the regulations, but the ambiguity of the phrase 
and the recognition of the parental relationship might likely 
create unwanted uncertainty for parents and schools. 136 
Similar concerns apply to same-sex partner caregivers to 
children eligible for services under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act. 137 In intact relationships, these 
obstacles can often be ameliorated by legal parent 
authorization, but the matter of records access and parental 
decision-making intensifies in emergencies, if such 
relationships sever, or in the event of the loss of the legally 
recognized parent. Additionally, matters of custody might be 
more complicated for schools, such as when there are disputes 
between same-sex parents or when the legal parent is unable to 
care for the child. By recognizing as marital partners same-sex 
parent couples who wish to enter the institution, states could 
ameliorate this uncertainty, which creates unnecessary 
ambiguity for families and schools alike. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If in coming years curricular shifts are observed relating to 
the acknowledgment of same-sex relationships and reduction of 
sexual orientation discrimination, those trends will likely be 
due more to social transformation than to any legal change 
recognizing the right to marry for same-sex couples. Those who 
wish to remove their children from classes relating to the topic 
may have options for doing so where their desire is consistent 
with the pluralist nature of American public schools. However, 
the debate surrounding same-sex marriage and public schools 
implicates parental rights in other ways as well. Refusal to 
recogmze marnage relationships, when combined with 
135. :!4 C. F.H. § 99.:i (201 0). 
136. !d. 
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1101(23) (2006) ("The term 'parent' includes- (A) a natural, 
adoptive, or foster parent (unless a foster parent is prohibited by State law from 
serving as a parent); (B) a guardian (but not the State if the child is a ward of the 
State); (C) an individual acting in the place of a natural or adoptive parent (including a 
grandparent, stepparent, or other relative) with whom the child lives, or an individual 
legally responsible for the child's welfare .... "). 
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adoption laws, may in some jurisdictions deny same-sex 
parents and their children benefits enjoyed by families 
parented by married heterosexuals. 
